Gali and Rabanal provide statistical evidence that, in their view, puts into question the real businesscycle paradigm in favor of the sticky-price paradigm. I demonstrate that their statistical procedure is easily misled in that they would reach the same conclusions even if their data had been simulated from an RBC model. I also demonstrate that sticky-price models do a poor job generating U.S.-like business cycles with only shocks to technology, the federal funds rate, and government consumption. This explains why Gali and Rabanal need large unobserved shocks to preferences and to the degree of monopoly power. 
Introduction
An important task of macroeconomists is the development of models that account for specific features of the business cycle. All policymakers would agree that having reliable models to analyze the effects of policy is useful. In taking on the important endeavor of developing reliable models, I applaud Gali and Rabanal (GR hereafter). I do, however, dispute some of their key findings.
GR survey research in the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) literature emphasizing the role of technology for the business cycle. (See the many references in GR's Section 2.2.) The findings of this literature are used to dismiss a line of business-cycle research beginning with Kydland and Prescott's (1982) "real business cycle" (RBC) model. The claim is that the data clearly show that RBC models are inconsistent in crucial ways with the observed behavior of the United States economy in the postwar period. This claim amounts to asserting that no RBC model can produce time series for key macro aggregates-namely productivity and hours-that have similar patterns to those in U.S. data. The SVAR literature arrives at this claim by estimating empirical impulse responses and noting that the responses are different from the theoretical impulse responses in most RBC models.
In these comments, I argue that the claim of the SVAR literature is incorrect. I do this by estimating a standard RBC model with maximum likelihood for U.S. data. My estimation procedure ensures that the model can account for the patterns of productivity and hours in the data. With this RBC model, I then show that the SVAR procedure is easily misled. I simulate time series for the model (many times), apply the SVAR procedure, and estimate empirical impulse responses. I show that these empirical impulse responses look very similar to those estimated in the literature. Thus, given data simulated from my model, the SVAR procedure would wrongly conclude that the data were not simulated from a real business cycle model.
The problem with trying to use the SVAR procedure to make broad claims about a class of models, like the entire class of RBC models, is the following: most RBC models do not satisfy the narrow set of identifying assumptions typically made in the SVAR literature.
My estimated RBC model is no exception. Hence, the SVAR procedure is misspecified with respect to most of the models it tries to shed light on.
On this point, I think there is some agreement between Gali and Rabanal and myself.
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The SVAR procedure is not useful for evaluating models or classes of models that do not satisfy the SVAR's precise identifying assumptions. I conclude from this that since we do not know the assumptions a priori, SVARs are not a useful guide to developing new models. Moreover, since we do not know the identifying assumptions a priori, the SVAR cannot robustly identify how the economy responds to shocks, like technology or monetary shocks. SVARs are potentially useful but only for classes of models which satisfy all of the identifying assumptions. In every application of which I am aware, the class of models that satisfy the explicit or implicit identifying assumptions of the SVAR procedure is an extremely small subset of the class of interesting models.
The false rejection of the RBC model motivates the second part of GR's study, a study of business cycles using a model with sticky prices. Unfortunately, like many other studies in the sticky-price literature, GR do not include investment in their model. I introduce investment into a version of their model and analyze its predictions for business cycles.
I find that technology shocks, monetary shocks, and government consumption shocks are of little importance in the sticky-price model. This explains why GR find that preference shocks and shocks to the degree of monopoly power play such a large role for aggregate fluctuations.
The Death Knell for RBC Theory
Gali and Rabanal first review the SVAR literature that considers the fit of real business cycle models and the role of technology shocks for business cycles. They ask, How well does the RBC model fit postwar U.S. data? The answer they give is 'not so well.' According to evidence from the SVARs, hours fall in response to technology shocks and the contribution of technology shocks to the business cycle is small. In standard RBC models, the opposite is true. Francis and Ramey (2002) , who have contributed to the SVAR literature that GR review, summarize the findings of this literature by saying that "the original technologydriven real business hypothesis does appear to be dead."
and/or misspecified SVAR often leads to incorrect inference. ... In those cases the finding of incorrect inference is neither surprising nor novel, since it restates points that have already been made in the literature."
Applying Blanchard-Quah
Let me start by summarizing how researchers in the SVAR literature reach the conclusion that RBC theory is not consistent with U.S. data. It is a direct application of Blanchard and Quah (1989) . They estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) using data on labor productivity and hours, invert it to get a moving average (MA) representation, and impose certain "structural" assumptions about the shocks hitting the economy. They then argue that the empirical impulse responses from the structural MA are very different from the theoretical impulse responses of a standard RBC model. Furthermore, they show that the contribution of technology shocks to output fluctuations is empirically small, a prediction at odds with standard RBC theories.
To be more precise, let X t be a two-dimensional vector containing the change in the log of labor productivity and the change in the log of hours. The first step is to estimate a vector autoregression by regressing X t on a certain number of lags. GR chose four. They invert this VAR to get the corresponding Wold moving average,
where v t is the residual from the VAR and Ev t v t = Ω. Mechanically, it is easy to recursively compute the B coefficients having estimates of the VAR coefficients. An estimate of the matrix Ω is easily constructed from the VAR residuals.
One more step is needed to derive the structural MA. The goal is to work with an MA process that has interpretable shocks, namely a shock they call a "technology" shock, and a shock they call a "demand" shock. In particular, the structural MA they use is
where Ee t e t = Σ, e t = C −1 0 v t , and C j = B j C 0 for j ≥ 1. The first element of e t is the technology shock and the second element is the demand shock.
We need identifying restrictions to determine the seven parameters in C 0 and Σ.
Seven restrictions typically used in the SVAR literature that GR review are as follows.
Three come from equating variance-covariance matrices (C 0 ΣC 0 = Ω). Three come from assuming that the shocks are orthogonal (Σ = I). The last comes from the assumption that demand shocks have no long-run effect on labor productivity ( j C j (1, 2) = 0). the nonfarm business sector as GR do, but with gross domestic product (GDP) and total hours. 2 In Figure 1 , I show the response of total hours to a one-time, one-percent innovation in technology (that is, a one-percent increase in the first element of e 0 ). I also plot the 95 percent confidence bands computed using the method described by Runkle (1987) . Using the aggregate series for productivity and hours is not a problem for GR, since I reach the same conclusions as they do. In particular, Figure 1 shows that hours fall on impact in response to a rise in technology. In standard RBC models, hours rise on impact in response.
A second statistic that is emphasized in the literature is the contribution of technology to the variance of logged output and hours, which is computed after these series are filtered with a band-pass filter. With data from the nonfarm business sector, GR find that only 7 percent of output fluctuations and 5 percent of hours fluctuations are due to technology. SVAR predicts that technology plays a small role in the business cycle.
A Standard RBC Model
I am going to evaluate the SVAR findings using a standard RBC model. In particular, I work with a version of the model in McGrattan (1994) with parameters estimated by maximum likelihood for U.S. data. I simulate many time series from that model, and I apply the SVAR procedure to the artificial data. This exercise allows me to compare the SVAR statistics to their theoretical counterparts. I also determine if the SVAR recovers the technology shocks that I feed into the model.
The model economy is a standard growth model with households, firms, and a government. The representative household with N t members in period t chooses per-capita consumption c, per-capita investment x, and the labor input l to solve the following maximization problem:
taking initial capital k 0 and processes for the rental rate r, wage rate w, the tax rates τ x and τ l , and transfers T t as given. I assume that N t grows at rate γ n .
The representative firm solves a simple static problem at t:
where θ is the share of capital in production, capital letters denote economy aggregates, and Z t is the level of technology which varies stochastically around a constant growth trend. In particular, I assume that Z t = (1 + γ z ) t z t where γ z is the trend growth rate and z t is stochastic. Total factor productivity in this economy is Z
The government sets rates of taxes and transfers in such a way that it can finance a stochastic sequence of per-capita purchases g t and satisfy its budget constraint, .997 each period. In equilibrium, the following conditions must hold:
The model has four exogenous shocks, namely total factor productivity, a tax on labor, a tax on investment, and government spending. The process governing these shocks is
where s t = [log z t , τ lt , τ xt , log g t −t log(1+γ z )]. I compute maximum likelihood estimates for P 0 , P , and Q using data on U.S. output, investment, hours, and government spending for the period 1959:1-2003:4. 3 These estimates are reported in Table 1 .
The Model Predictions
Given estimates for the parameters, I compute an equilibrium for the model economy which implies decision rules for c t , x t , l t , and k t+1 in terms of the state variables k t , z t , τ lt , τ xt , and g t (once I have detrended all variables that grow over time).
I can use these decision rules to compute impulse responses and contributions to the output spectrum for each of the four shocks. Because P and Q are not diagonal, a specification soundly rejected by a likelihood ratio test, estimates of the theoretical impulse responses and the contributions to the spectrum depend on how I decompose QQ (or, equivalently, how I order s keeping Q lower triangular). For the estimated parameters in Table 1 Given the empirical findings of the SVAR, GR and others they survey conclude that RBC models such as the one I just described are simply not consistent with U.S. data.
The Death Knell for the SVAR Procedure?
I now describe an obvious check on the SVAR methodology. I act as the data generating process and let the SVAR user be the detective. This is a game I play when I teach students at the University of Minnesota. I give the students "data" for an economy of my 
Why Does the SVAR Get It So Wrong?
The literature that directly or indirectly critiques the SVAR approach gives us many possible answers to this question. Let me summarize what I have learned from these exercises. We should not view the empirical impulse responses from an SVAR as something we want our theoretical impulse responses to reproduce. SVAR users can and should do the same diagnostic checks as Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2004) . The analysis has to be done within the context of a theoretical model or a class of theoretical models. Of course, this brings us full circle: once we construct a theoretical model, there is no reason to use an SVAR.
A Triple-Sticky Model vs. U.S. Facts
The second part of Gali and Rabanal's paper considers life "after RBC models" (which was the original title of the paper). They describe a model that, at least for some parameterizations, is consistent with the VAR evidence laid out in the first part of their paper. This model, which I call the "triple-sticky" model has sticky prices, sticky wages, and habit persistence ("sticky consumption"). They estimate the model and report the contributions of different shocks to aggregate fluctuations. From that, they conclude that demand factors-not technological factors-are key for business cycles.
A Forgotten Lesson From RBC Theory
Before discussing the triple-sticky business-cycle model, I should review an important lesson from the RBC literature. GR's triple-sticky model includes lots of frictions. Unfortunately, it excludes the key component in modern business cycle models: investment.
One important lesson from previous business-cycle research is that the main impact of technology on the cycle is through investment, not through hours. By leaving out investment, GR are minimizing the role that technology would have. For this reason, I
bring investment back in.
A Triple-Sticky Model with Investment
The model I work with has many of the same elements as those in McGrattan (2000, 2002) and McGrattan (1999) . In order to compare my results to those of GR, I also allow for habit persistence in consumer preferences and preference shocks.
Effects of Monetary Shocks
One of the main results in GR is that demand shocks are the main force for the business cycle. Given the choice of model used by GR, it is natural to ask if money is an important demand shock. Nominal rigidities let money shocks have real effects, and habit persistence extends the effects. This is reminiscent of the finding of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) . To generate U.S.-like business cycles, Rotemberg and Woodford need large and variable shocks to preferences and to a variable called aggregate demand appearing in the resource constraint.
In the appendix to their paper they report that standard deviations of the shocks to preferences are 13.7 percent. This is large relative to the standard deviation of logged output which is only 2.1 percent.
The fluctuations of aggregate demand shocks, which are shocks to the resource constraint and enter additively with consumption, are even larger. The standard deviation is 29.5 percent, 14 times that of logged output. Furthermore, plotting the aggregate demand shocks yields a picture that looks a lot like inflation. This is not surprising since there is a large gap between actual and predicted inflation without the unobserved shocks.
In summary, given my calculations and those of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , I
was not surprised that GR find they need a large role for unobserved preference shocks and shocks to the degree of monopoly power. I am not convinced that this is progress. It seems to me that we are simply replacing an old black box ("technology shocks") with a new black box ("demand shocks").
Conclusions
GR have written a thought-provoking paper claiming that RBC models are not consistent with U.S. data. I have shown that the SVAR methodology they use fails a simple diagnostic test. When given data from an RBC model, the SVAR procedure tells us that the data could not have come from an RBC model. I have analyzed a version of GR's triple-sticky model, extending it to include investment. Like GR, I find that the model does a poor job generating U.S.-like business cycles with only technology and monetary shocks. The fit of GR's model to U.S. data, therefore, requires the inclusion of large unobserved shocks to preferences and to the degree of monopoly power.
Finally, I should note that the RBC literature has moved far beyond Kydland and Prescott (1982) . Current research is modeling sources of variation in total factor productivity in large part as arising from variations in government policies, not from variations in the stock of blueprints.
6 This work came about partly in response to claims that total factor productivity in Kydland and Prescott (1982) was an exogenous black box. I encourage GR to consider these recent studies before shifting the black box from technology to demand.
A. Appendix
This appendix provides details of the triple-sticky model I simulate. For details on computation, see McGrattan (2004) .
In each period t, the model economy experiences one of finitely many events s t . I denote by s t = (s 0 , . . . , s t ) the history of events up through and including period t. The probability, as of period zero, of any particular history s t is π(s t ). The initial realization s 0 is given.
There are producers of final goods and intermediate goods. Final goods producers behave competitively and solve a static profit-maximization problem. In each period producers choose inputs y(i) for i ∈ [0, 1] and output y to maximize profits:
where y is the final good, P is the price of the final good, y(i) are intermediate goods, and More specifically, the problem solved by the intermediate goods producers setting prices is to choose sequences of prices P (i), capital stocks k(i), investments x(i), and labor inputs l(i, j), j = 1, . . . , N to maximize
subject to the input demand, the production technology:
the constraint on labor
the law of motion for capital used in producing good i .5) and the following constraints on prices:
P (i, s t−1 ) = P (i, s t ) = . . . P (i, s t+N −1 ) P (i, s t+N ) = P (i, s t+N +1 ) = . . . P (i, s t+2N −1 ) (A.6) and so on, whereQ(s τ ) is the τ th period Arrow-Debreu price (that is, a product of the one-period Q(s t |s t−1 )'s).
Consider next the problem faced by consumers of final goods who are wage-setters.
One can think of the economy organized into a continuum of unions indexed by j. Each union j consists of all the consumers in the economy with labor of type j. This union realizes that it faces a downward sloping demand curve for its type of labor. It sets nominal wages for N periods at t, t + N , t + 2N , and so on. Thus, it faces constraints and so on in addition to the ones I describe below.
The problem solved by a consumer of type j is to maximize utility: There are also borrowing constraints B(s t+1 ) ≥ −P (s t )b. M and B are consumers' holdings of money and contingent claims, Q is the price of the claims, W (j, s t−1 ) is the nominal wage chosen by one cohort of consumers, Π are profits, and T are government transfers.
The consumer agrees to supply whatever is demanded at that wage chosen.
The government in this world behaves in such a way that the nominal interest rate set by the Federal Reserve is given by r(s t ) = a [r(s t−1 ), r(s t−2 ), r(s t−3 ), E t log(P (s t+1 )/P (s t )), log(P (s t )/P (s t−1 )), log(P (s t−1 )/P (s t−2 )), log(P (s t−2 )/P (s t−3 )), log y(s t ), log y(s t−1 ), log y(s t−2 )] + constant + r,t .
(A.8)
The government also spends g(s t ), and thus, the economy-wide resource constraint is y(s t ) = , and φ(x/k) = 10(x/k − δ) 2 . The Taylor rule in (A.8) is that estimated by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) .
